The Journey Begins

Experts bring to the table skills that balance on years of experience, but also face the daunting task of keeping up with new generations, new technologies, and a rapidly changing environment. Students bring to the table fresh ideas that intercorrelate with revolutionary technologies, a fast-paced lifestyle, and social experiences in a global environment.

I have an Associates Degree in Graphic Design, and am now majoring in National Security and Intelligence, and Political-Science, and minoring in Criminal Justice at Fairmont State University. I have  experience in research and analysis, and some experience with Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Image Intelligence (IMINT)–mostly through classes I have taken, but also through my own projects. My research papers have included the Skripal spy poisoning, the layout of the Dawa party, and ideas on how to improve security in the D.C. area (specifically the White House, WMATA Metro System, and the BWI Airport). National Security and homeland defense are critical aspects that often need to be reviewed and corrected in the face of evolving threats.

My education has covered broad spectrums–from art and foreign languages, to psychology and sociology, to security and international relations. Some of the classes I have taken over the past 12 years include Intelligence Research, Propaganda and Politics, Defense Intelligence, National Security Law, Russian Intelligence, Homeland Security, and International Law. I will be graduating in December 2018, and will be merging into the Intelligence Community. Even as I learn and grow as a student now and a some-day member of the IC, I hope this blog gives you a new perspective on world events and politics–from the student point of view.

America needs a new generation of leaders to address the big issues facing the country: alleviating the middle class squeeze and promoting economic opportunity, confronting the significant national security challenges threatening the safety of our people, and reforming the culture of Washington, D.C. — Ron DeSantis

 

 

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Using Intelligence Disciplines to Determine the Impact of Political Change in Afghanistan

Currently, politics in Afghanistan are dominated by democratic parties, including the president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. Determining what could happen if terrorist-aligned parties gained more power in the next election is an important step in ensuring America is ready to handle any change in Afghanistan politics. The five collection disciplines—Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Geo-spacial Intelligence (GEOINT), and Measurement and Signatures (MASINT) allows national security agencies to gain the necessary information on the target or subject.

How Terrorist Propaganda Affects the People’s Perception of the Islamic Dawa Party

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

  • The agency or agencies involved will be tasked with finding language analysts who work with Pashto and Dari to find information in Open-Source Intelligence sources related to Taliban and ISIS propaganda, as well as Afghanistan politics. The Open-Source Intelligence personnel will require the assistance of Computational Linguists to work with a linguist who knows the language to track the public reaction to the party as matters develop, as the volume of information is enormous and, as such, they will need to determine who is actually a key player or follower of the subject and who is not interested in the subject.1

  • OSINT will need to sift through various social media sources, including Facebook, Twitter, terrorist websites, and YouTube, for terrorist propaganda and the people’s reaction to that propaganda. OSINT will also need to access local media sources that are supported by the Taliban, and determine if there is any relevant information on the Islamic Dawa Party or the people’s reaction to the party based on terrorist propaganda they may follow as a source.

  • OSINT may need to access the United States Air Force Air University Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center’s website for explanations of how various kinds of information warfare work.2

  • OSINT analysts familiar with Pashto and Dari may also need to watch press conferences by political leaders and terrorist-aligned leaders, and read local media news and magazine output to determine what kind of propaganda the terrorists are using to influence the people.

  • OSINT will need to access various deep-web databases (like Igenta3) to read through professional and academic sources related to the Islamic Dawa Party and their allegiance with terrorist organizations as well as information on how these terrorists use propaganda to influence the people.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • HUMINT personnel will talk to the Afghanistan government to determine any pertinent information regarding the Islamic Dawa Party and their connections with terrorist organizations and leaders.

  • HUMINT will talk to informants in the Dawa Party and in the related terrorist organizations about what is being said and done. HUMINT may consider recruiting more assets as necessary to the operation.

  • HUMINT will access information on relevant interrogations and consider present interrogations of individuals currently related to the Islamic Dawa party (if any) and the Taliban.

  • HUMINT will access or conduct debriefings of military personnel who met with Taliban leaders and forces, or with political leadership from the Islamic Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will speak with the Afghanistan National Police to determine any relevant information regarding Taliban propaganda, including interceptions of recent propaganda involving the Islamic Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will speak with and use diplomats from the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan to determine what information is being passed in the region.

  • HUMINT will be used to determine whether local media sources are being pressured or bribed by the terrorist organizations to push Taliban propaganda to influence the people into voting for the DAWA party.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

  • The SIGINT personnel will be working with the linguistic analysts in Communications Intelligence, through content analysis of communications between politicians backed by terrorist organizations, and the terrorist operatives involved.

  • SIGINT personnel will also preform traffic analysis to determine information on how long calls were between terrorists and politicians, how many calls there were, and who communicated with who after communicating with terrorist operatives.

  • SIGINT may be used to determine the geo-location of the calls made by terrorists to determine their location in the region, and track where their organization operates through electronic collections (ELINT).

  • SIGINT will also be used via ELINT to determine if other forms of communications are being used between terrorist operatives and politicians, including satellite phones, and intercept those communications as necessary and possible.

Geospacial Intelligence (GEOINT)

  • It is not possible to use GEOINT to determine anything related to terrorist propaganda, as the propaganda can not be tracked through geographical means via electro-optical, infrared, thermal, or radar sensors.

Measurement and Signatures (MASINT)

  • It is not possible to use MASINT to determine anything related to terrorist propaganda, as the propaganda can not be tracked through sounds or substance analysis, bio-metrics, or radar cross sections.

How the Drug Trade Will Affect the Dawa Party

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

  • OSINT will need to access various deep web databases to read through professional and academic sources regarding the current drug trade in Afghanistan and its economic relationship to the Dawa Party as a source of funding, as well as any new developments.

  • OSINT will need to sift through various social media sources, including Facebook, Twitter, terrorist websites, and YouTube, to determine if the Dawa Party’s stance on the drug trade, as well as determine if the political candidate from that party is talking about using the drug trade as a source of income.

  • OSINT will also need to access local media sources that are supported by or that support the Dawa Party and terrorist organizations linked with them, to determine if there is any relevant information on drug trade as it relates to the Islamic Dawa Party.

  • OSINT analysts familiar with Pashto and Dari may also need to watch press conferences by political leaders and terrorist-aligned leaders, and read local media news and magazine output, to determine if there is any relevant information on drug trade as it relates to the Islamic Dawa Party.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • HUMINT personnel will talk to the Afghanistan government to determine any pertinent information regarding the drug trade and its affect on the Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will access or conduct debriefings of military personnel and other essential personnel who dealt with poppy seed fields and farmers, or who met with political leadership from the Islamic Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will talk to informants in the Dawa Party and in the poppy seed industry to determine any pertinent information regarding the drug trade and its affect on the Dawa Party, including the economic impact that the drug trade has on the Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will access information on relevant interrogations and consider present interrogations of individuals currently related to the drug trade.

  • HUMINT will speak with the Afghanistan National Police and Afghanistan government to determine any relevant information regarding the drug trade, including if any politicians are involved in the drug trade.

  • Use HUMINT to determine whether any of the political parties are being pressured or bribed by the terrorist organizations via the drug trade.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

  • The SIGINT personnel will be working with the linguistic analysts in Communications Intelligence, through content analysis of communications between politicians backed by terrorist organizations, and the terrorist operatives involved to determine how the drug trade is affecting the Dawa Party.

  • SIGINT personnel will also preform traffic analysis to determine information on how long calls were between terrorists, leadership in the Dawa Party, and drug traffickers and farmers; how many calls there were, and who communicated with who after communicating with terrorist operatives or farmers.

  • SIGINT may be used to determine the geolocation of the calls made by or to drug traffickers and/or farmers, to determine their location in the region, and track where they travel and operate through electronic collections (ELINT).

  • SIGINT will also be used via ELINT to determine what forms of communications are being used between terrorist operatives and their clients, including satellite phones, and intercept those communications as necessary and possible.

Geo-spacial Intelligence (GEOINT)

  • Establishing whether the people are from the area where the poppy fields are, or whether they travel there to collect money or for other similar reasons.

Measurement and Signatures (MASINT)

  • MASINT will be used to determine if any of the members of the Dawa Party have come in contact with poppy seeds or other elements of the drug trade recently.4

Who the Key Players in the Dawa Party Are

Open-source Intelligence (OSINT)

  • OSINT will be tasked with finding language analysts who work with Pashto and Dari to find information in Open-Source Intelligence sources related the Dawa Party.

  • OSINT will need to sift through various social media sources, including Facebook, Twitter, terrorist websites, and YouTube, for information on who the key players are and how they operate. OSINT will also need to access local media sources that are supported by the Taliban, and determine if there is any relevant information on the Islamic Dawa Party key players.

  • OSINT analysts familiar with Pashto and Dari may also need to watch press conferences by political leaders and terrorist-aligned leaders, and read local media news and magazine output to determine who the key players are and what their strengths and weaknesses are.

  • OSINT will need to access various deep web databases (like JSTOR5) to read through professional and academic sources related to the Islamic Dawa Party to determine who the key players are.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • HUMINT personnel will talk to the Afghanistan government to determine any pertinent information regarding who the key parties are in the Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will access or conduct debriefings of military personnel and other essential personnel in an attempt to determine who the key parties are in the Dawa Party and how they operate.

  • HUMINT will speak with the appropriate personnel and informants to determine what the weaknesses and strengths are of the key players.

  • HUMINT will access information on relevant interrogations and consider present interrogations of individuals currently and previously related to the Dawa Party.

  • HUMINT will be used to determine whether any of the key players are being pressured or bribed by the terrorist organizations.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

  • The SIGINT personnel will be working with the linguistic analysts in Communications Intelligence, through content analysis of communications between politicians backed by terrorist organizations, and the terrorist operatives involved to determine who the key players are in the Dawa Party and what their means of communications are, including styles of encryption used.

  • SIGINT personnel will also preform traffic analysis to determine information on how long calls were between terrorists and each key player, how many calls there were, and who communicated with who after communicating with terrorist operatives in the various regions of Afghanistan.

  • SIGINT may be used to determine the geolocation of the calls made by or to key players, to determine their location in the region, and track where they travel and operate through electronic collections (ELINT).

  • SIGINT will also be used via ELINT to determine what forms of communications are being used between terrorist operatives and key players, including satellite phones, and intercept those communications as necessary and possible.

Geo-spacial Intelligence (GEOINT)

  • It is not possible to use GEOINT to determine anything related to figuring out who the key players are, as the identities of the key players can not be tracked through electro-optical, infrared, thermal, or radar sensors.

Measurement and Signatures (MASINT)

  • MASINT could be used to determine the identities of key players through bio-metrics.

How the Dawa Party Will React to U.S. Foreign Policy

Open-source Intelligence (OSINT)

  • OSINT will be tasked with finding language analysts who work with Pashto and Dari to find information in Open-Source Intelligence sources related the Dawa Party and their reaction to U.S. Foreign Policy matters.

  • OSINT will need to sift through various social media sources, including Facebook, Twitter, terrorist websites, and YouTube, to determine their reaction to U.S. Foreign Policy matters. OSINT will also need to access local media sources that are supported by the Taliban, and determine if there is any relevant information on the Islamic Dawa Party’s reactions.

  • OSINT will need to access various deep web databases to determine what reactions there are. These databases may include the LexisNexis Academic Database.6

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • HUMINT personnel will talk to the Afghanistan government to determine any the reactions of the Dawa Party to U.S. Foreign Policy.

  • HUMINT will access or conduct debriefings of military personnel and other essential personnel in an attempt to determine any the reactions of the Dawa Party to U.S. Foreign Policy, and how the terrorist organizations influence those reactions.

  • HUMINT will speak with the appropriate personnel and informants to determine any the reactions of the Dawa Party to U.S. Foreign Policy.

  • HUMINT will access information on relevant interrogations and consider present interrogations of individuals currently and previously related to the Dawa Party to determine any the reactions of the Dawa Party to U.S. Foreign Policy..

  • HUMINT will be used to determine whether any of the key players are being pressured or bribed by the terrorist organizations to react a certain way to U.S. Foreign Policy.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

  • The SIGINT personnel will be working with the linguistic analysts in Communications Intelligence, through content analysis of communications between politicians backed by terrorist organizations, and the terrorist operatives involved to determine how the Dawa Party is reacting to U.S. Foreign Policy.

Geo-spacial Intelligence (GEOINT)

  • It is not possible to use GEOINT to determine anything related to the reactions of the Dawa Party to U.S. Foreign Policy, as the reactions can not be tracked through geographical means via electro-optical, infrared, thermal, or radar sensors.

Measurement and Signatures (MASINT)

  • It is not possible to use MASINT to determine anything related to the reactions of the Dawa Party to U.S. Foreign Policy, as the reactions can not be tracked through sounds or substance analysis, bio-metrics, or radar cross sections.

Influence and Power of the Dawa Party in Different Regions of Afghanistan

Open-source Intelligence (OSINT)

  • OSINT will need to sift through various social media sources, including Facebook, Twitter, terrorist websites, and YouTube, to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan. OSINT will also need to access local media sources that are supported by the Taliban.

  • OSINT will need to access various deep-web databases to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • HUMINT personnel will talk to the Afghanistan government to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan.

  • HUMINT will access or conduct debriefings of military personnel and other essential personnel in an attempt to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan..

  • HUMINT will speak with the appropriate personnel and informants to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan. HUMINT may also consider recruiting new assets in the various regions, as necessary.

  • HUMINT will access information on relevant interogations and consider present interrogations of individuals currently and previously related to the Dawa Party to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan.

  • HUMINT will be used to determine the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

  • The SIGINT personnel will be working with the linguistic analysts in Communications Intelligence, through content analysis of communications between politicians backed by terrorist organizations, and the terrorist operatives involved to determine how the two organizations communicate between each other and with locals in each of the different regions of Afghanistan.

  • SIGINT personnel will also preform traffic analysis to determine information on how long calls were between terrorists and politicians, how many calls there were, and who communicated with who after communicating with terrorist operatives in the various regions of Afghanistan, to determine the difference in levels of communication between the two parties and with locals in each of the different regions of Afghanistan.

  • SIGINT may be used to determine the geolocation of the calls made by terrorists to determine their location in the region, and track where their organization operates through electronic collections (ELINT).

  • SIGINT will also be used via ELINT to determine what forms of communications are being used between terrorist operatives and politicians in each region, including satellite phones, and intercept those communications as necessary and possible.

Geospacial Intelligence (GEOINT)

  • GEOINT will be used via UAV’s, planes, and satellites to determine the movements and potential weaponry of terrorist organizations in each region of Afghanistan.7

Measurement and Signatures (MASINT)

  • It is not possible to use MASINT to determine anything related to the influence and power of the Dawa Party in different regions of Afghanistan, as the influence and power can not be tracked through sounds or substance analysis, bio-metrics, or radar cross sections.

Likelihood of the Dawa Party Gaining Power in Afghanistan

Open-source Intelligence (OSINT)

  • OSINT will need to sift through various social media sources, including Facebook, Twitter, terrorist websites, and YouTube, to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

  • OSINT will need to access various deep-web databases to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

  • HUMINT personnel will talk to the Afghanistan government to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

  • HUMINT will access or conduct debriefings of military personnel and other essential personnel in an attempt to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

  • HUMINT will speak with the appropriate personnel and informants to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

  • HUMINT will access information on relevant interrogations and consider present interrogations of individuals currently and previously related to the Dawa Party to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

  • The SIGINT personnel will be working with the linguistic analysts in Communications Intelligence, through content analysis of communications between politicians backed by terrorist organizations, and the terrorist operatives involved, to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan.

Geo-spacial Intelligence (GEOINT)

  • It is not possible to use GEOINT to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan, as the power can not be tracked through geographical means via electro-optical, infrared, thermal, or radar sensors.

Measurement and Signatures (MASINT)

  • It is not possible to use MASINT to determine the likelihood of the Dawa Party gaining power in Afghanistan, as the power can not be tracked through sounds or substance analysis, bio-metrics, or radar cross sections.

Understanding the Intelligence Discliplines

Open-Source Intelligence involves non-clandestine information that is publicly available that anyone can obtain lawfully and legally, although some OSINT information can still be classified, as it may need to be hidden from enemy view, and may contain value-added information. OSINT sources include newspapers and magazines, books, databases including scholarly articles, social media, outside experts, and oral historians. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) involves intercepting, decoding, and/or disrupting the enemy’s devices that send or receive a signal. This includes Communications Intelligence (COMINT), which derives intelligence from electronic items used used for communications, like cellphones; and Electronic Collection (ELINT), which collects data from electronic sources, like telemetry, satellite phone communications, and GPS. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is where a human goes out and gets information from another human being, whether in the Intelligence Community, through outside experts, or in the field. HUMINT includes interrogations, debriefings; and overt intelligence, which includes diplomats, military attaches, and law enforcement personnel. There is also clandestine HUMINT (espionage), which involves keeping the relationship between ourselves and individual informants (assets) secret. Geo-spacial Intelligence (GEOINT) involves using electro-optical, infrared, thermal, or radar sensors to determine information about the earth and what is on it, including geology, geography, meteorology, ecology, topography, and hydrology. GEOINT can be used via a variety of sources, including plane, helicopter, satellite, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s). Measures and Signal Intelligence (MASINT) identifies the specific characteristics of a thing, person, or activity. This includes technology like a mass-spectrometer to identify different substances and sounds, radar cross sections, and bio-metric signatures.

Conclusion

Politics in Afghanistan are currently centered around dominant Democratic parties, but this could change if terrorist organizations were to support a chosen candidate and successfully influence politics in a different direction, towards a caliphate or otherwise Islamic-oriented government. Determining how and what could happen if terrorist-aligned parties gained more power in the next election is critical to U.S. national security.

1 Owens, Trevor. “Computational Linguistics & Social Media Data: An Interview with Bryan Routledge.” Library of Congress. August 1, 2014. Accessed October 12, 2016. https://blogs.loc.gov/thesignal/2014/08/computational-linguistics-social-media-data-an-interview-with-bryan-routledge/.

2 USAF. “Infowar, Information Warfare.” Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center. Accessed October 13, 2016. http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/infowar.htm.

3 Shanahan, Rodger. “Shi’a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da’wa Party.” Ingenta Connect. July 5, 2004. Accessed October 12, 2016. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/search/article?option1=tka&value1=Islamic Dawa party&pageSize=10&index=1.

4 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Report. October 2014. Accessed October 13, 2016. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf.

5 Shanahan, Rodger. “Shi’a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da’wa Party.” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004): 943-54. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.fairmontstate.edu/stable/3993703.

6 “DPC warns government against reopening Nato supplies.” Business Recorder. February 13, 2012 Monday . Date Accessed: 2016/10/13. http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

7 Deogawanka, Sangeeta. “How GIS Supports the Fight Against Terrorism.” GIS Lounge. January 29, 2015. Accessed October 11, 2016. https://www.gislounge.com/gis-supports-fight-terrorism/.

Missions of the FSB and SVR

 

The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operates mostly in the U.S. and Western Europe, whereas the Federal Security Service (FSB) operates mostly in the former Soviet Republics, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both agencies compete for Putin’s attention, often interrupting the other’s operations.

The SVR, which was known as the KGB until 1991, takes on the role of “Big Brother” in multilateral meetings or bilateral talks. Putin served as an agent for the SVR in East Germany in the 1980s, and is one of their best-known graduates. The SVR, which employs 13,000 people, is the the Russian equivalent of the CIA, and today it works parallel with the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). According to the SVR mission statement, it is a “modern special service employing talented, ambitious people devoted to the Motherland and their military duty.1 Like the SVR, the FSB operates in tactical missions, against foreign and domestic enemies.2 Due to the competitive nature of the two, their Area of Operations sometimes overlaps and they trip over each other. Both operate domestically and internationally, and have trained with the U.S. in the past.3 The SVR operates to ensure the security of individuals, state, and society from external threats, and it carries out intelligence operations in support of Russia’s president, the Federal Assembly, and the government.4

The Federal Security Services (FSB)—sometimes also referred to as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—is the Russian counterpart to the American FBI, and operates as Putin’s “right-hand” agency. On June 30, 2003, an amendment was added to the “Law on the Organs of the Federal Security Service,” allowing the FSB to deal with foreign intelligence. The SVR operates through three types of foreign agents: deep cover assignments, where the agents take on false identities, work ‘normal’ jobs, and take measures to conceal their connections to Russia; assignments where agents are sent abroad to conceal their links to Russia and pretend to be representatives of Russia in positions like diplomats or trade officials; and agents who operate under non-official cover (NOCs) status.5 The FSB answers only to Putin and conducts operations that include assassinations of political opponents. The Institute of Cryptography and Protection of Information (IKSI), which is the FSB’s own institution, originally used to work with code breaking but now is primarily focused on information security. Security services expert Andrei Soldatov estimates that there are at least 200,000 working for the FSB.6

The more that the Kremlin turned to the FSB, the more the FSB became Russia’s most powerful secret service. While the SVR had signed an agreement not to spy within the territories, the FSB had not, and was free of any such agreement. The FSB was permitted to create a new directorate that would focus on Russia’s near-abroad in late 1999, and the new Directorate of Operative Information (UKOI) was established inside the Department of Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning. Its structure was designed on geographical lines, and the officers were given the ability to travel throughout the near-abroad.7

1 “Profile: Russia’s SVR Intelligence Agency.” BBC News. June 29, 2010. Accessed April 03, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/10447308.

2“Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation – CSN FSB.” YouTube. August 06, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=80ZlopfIKzo.

3 TheGlobeandMail. “What You Need to Know about the Three Main Arms of Russia’s Intelligence Apparatus.” YouTube. April 03, 2017. Accessed April 07, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nbn_zs8wO8c.

4“Russian Special Forces – Foreign Intelligence.” YouTube. July 15, 2017. Accessed April 07, 2018. https://youtu.be/bE6y27MU52Y.

5 Bender, Jeremy. “FBI Agent Explains How Russia’s Foreign Spy Operations Work.” Business Insider. January 26, 2015. Accessed April 04, 2018. http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-agent-how-russias-foreign-intelligence-service-works-2015-1.

6Walker, Shaun. “FSB: Vladimir Putin’s Immensely Powerful Modern-day KGB.” The Guardian. October 06, 2013. Accessed April 08, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/06/fsb-putins-modern-day-kgb.

7“Russia’s Very Secret Services.” World Policy. February 23, 2018. Accessed April 04, 2018. https://worldpolicy.org/2010/03/23/russias-very-secret-services/.

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